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Abstract 
The inability of Benin to comply with EU standards led to a ban on its shrimp exports. 
We show that the ban had a negative impact on the income of fishmongers and 
fishermen, in the short run, but also several years after it was lifted. The impact persisted 
because exports to the EU did not revive and the local shrimp demand could not fully 
compensate for the loss of the EU market. A small number of local actors coped with the 
ban by moving out of the sector, but the large majority were locked in the local fishery 
sector. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The WTO agreements on sanitary and phyto-sanitary standards in 1995 coincided with 
important changes in the food safety and quality standards of major food importing 
economies (e.g., the EU, the USA and Japan). More food standards were being imposed 
that apply to more products and to more substances. The standards have also become 
tighter, and full traceability is required through Hazard Analysis Critical Control Points 
(HACCP1). Furthermore, there are now more internal and border controls, which increase 
the probability of detection of non-compliance (European Commission, 2009).  
While these measures are likely to have achieved their primary objective of 
improved consumer-health protection in developed economies (e.g., Golan et al., 2000), 
they have come at a cost as producers need to devote additional financial and human 
resources to complying with them. These additional costs have raised concerns that 
standards may act as barriers to trade for those countries and small-scale producers with 
relatively few resources and limited expertise (e.g., Athukorala and Jayasuriya, 2003; 
Garcia Martinez and Poole, 2004; Gibbon, 2003; Henson, and Loader, 2001; Kherralah, 
2000; Reardon et al. 1999; Key and Runsten, 1999; Farina and Reardon, 2000; Unnevehr, 
2000).2  
Besides additional costs, producers are also facing new risks, including 
withdrawal of their product from the market, rejection of exports at the border, 
destruction of shipments, or, in the worst case – an outright export ban on all products 
from the company or the sector involved (e.g., Batz and Morris, 2011). Several papers 
have looked at case studies of such worst case scenarios, investigating the impact of an 
export ban triggered by non-compliance with food standards (e.g., Alavi, 2009, Dey et 
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al., 2005, Yunus, 2009, Cato and Santos, 2000, Calzadilla-Sarmiento, 2002, Keizire, 
2004; UNIDO, 2002). While most of these studies document huge compliance costs and 
thus negative short-run effects when the ban is imposed, they also show a revival of the 
export market when the ban is lifted, and in general find that the upgrading of the sector 
lead to positive medium- and long-run impacts.3  
This paper adds to this literature with an in-depth case study of the impact of the 
ban on shrimp exports from Benin, triggered by the failure to comply with EU-food 
safety standards. The ban4 was introduced in July 2003 and lasted for almost two years, 
being lifted only in February 2005. Export failed, however, to revive. We give the 
reasons for this failure, and study the short and medium-run effects of this shock on the 
small-scale actors in Benin’s shrimp supply chain (fishermen and fishmongers). Our 
study diverts from the existing body of research in two ways. First, we examine a case in 
which the export sector did not resume, even after the ban was lifted. Second, we 
evaluate the impact of the ban not only in terms of sector-level export performance but 
also on the basis of a welfare analysis at the level of small-scale producers. In this 
analysis we document the income effect of the ban and how it is determined by fishermen 
and fishmongers’ access to coping strategies.  
Through this analysis, our paper connects to a second strand of literature that 
examines household coping strategies in the context of negative shocks, ranging from 
rainfall shocks, to natural disasters, war, illness, financial crises, market liberalization and 
various international trade shocks (e.g. Beegle et al., 2006, Dercon, 2004, Duryea et al., 
2007, McKenzie, 2003, Orr and Mwale, 2001, Skoufias, 2003, Varangis et al., 2003, 
Verpoorten, 2009). This literature documents that, when faced with a non-negligible 
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adverse income shock, households in developing countries resort to a wide range of 
coping strategies in order to smooth consumption, including self-insurance through 
dissaving, increased labor effort, migration and mutual insurance. The choice of strategy 
depends on the size and the type of the shock (e.g. Dercon, 2004).  
The export ban of Benin can be characterized as a covariant and highly persistent 
shock, i.e., many households within the same community were negatively affected at the 
same time and the shock was not limited to one point in time. Looking at the impact of 
such a shock among fishermen is a timely contribution. Due to the intrinsic product-
specific sanitary risk, the fishery sector is profoundly affected by the EU food safety 
standards. For instance, data from the Rapid Alert System for Food and Feed (RASFF5) 
indicate that fishery products (fisheries and crustaceans) account, on average, for the 
largest share of notifications among all imports of food and feed products (42% in 1995-
2011) and the second largest share for borders refusals (43% in 2008-2011). How well 
can fishermen communities cope with such risks? 
The next section presents the background of this study. Section 3 studies the 
impact of the ban on small-scale actors, first in an open-economy supply-demand model, 
then relying on survey data collected by the authors. Section 4 contains discussion and 
concluding remarks. 
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2. BACKGROUND 
First, we give an overview of Benin’s shrimp supply chain. Then, we present a narrative 
account of the ban and its aftermath. 
2.1 Benin’s shrimp export sector 
The main shrimp specimen in Benin is Penaeus duorarum burkenroad,6 which migrates 
from the sea to inland waters to mature and (when not caught in the inland waters) returns 
to the sea after having reached adult size.7 The shrimp are mainly caught in the southern 
lakes of Nokoué and Ahémé and in the lagoon of Porto Novo.8 Shrimp fishing is a 
seasonal activity that takes place during an 8-month period, from January, when the 
shrimp migrate to the inland waters, to August, when they return to the sea. The stock of 
inland shrimp available to fishermen fluctuates between years with rainfall playing an 
important role by determining the amount of nutrients in, and the salinity of, the water.  
The inland fisheries of Benin are dominated by artisanal fishermen (male, with a 
few exceptions), who use small wooden canoes. After being caught by the fishermen, 
fishmongers (mostly the fishermen’s wives) collect the shrimp on the water from the 
canoes or at numerous landing sites and sell them directly to local consumers, to other 
intermediate traders, or to the collectors recognized by the exporting firms. In the last 
case, the shrimp are sent by vehicles fitted with isothermal containers to the exporting 
plants.  
Before the imposition of the ban in July 2003, there were three exporting firms: 
CRUSTAMER, SOBEP and SFG. During the ban none of the three could operate. 
Following the lift of the ban in February 2005, CRUSTAMER and SFG re-opened but 
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stopped exporting shrimp a few months later. In 2005, a new firm called DIAX entered 
the market. It is the only firm operating at the moment (October 2014), even though with 
frequent interruptions because of financing problems. DIAX is a relatively small firm that 
specializes in the export of fresh langoustines, fish and shrimp. The other companies 
mainly exported frozen shrimp. For instance, the shrimp purchased by the largest 
company, CRUSTAMER, were peeled, frozen at –45° C, and exported mainly to Spain 
from where they are further distributed to other European countries (Colette, 2003).  
Figure 1 gives an overview of the actors along the supply chain of inland shrimp. 
In addition to the three actors mentioned above, the overview includes two additional 
ones: the banks that provide the exporting firms with credit and the Directorate of 
Fisheries, which is the competent authority that controls and regulates fisheries in Benin.  
FIGURE 1 HERE 
The shrimp sector represents an important source of employment in Benin. It has 
been estimated that, in 2002 (prior to the ban on export to the EU), the sector provided 
income to 45,000 fishermen, 18,500 female intermediate traders, 150 collectors 
recognized by the exporting firms, and 50 permanent employees and 1,200 seasonal 
employees (mostly women) of the exporting firms (BTC, 2007; Le Ry et al., 2007). In 
total, the shrimp sector created employment for 64,900 people, and so, when dependents 
are included – contributed to the livelihood of about 250,000 people in Benin or about 
4% of the population.  
In 2002, approximately a third of the 3,000 tonnes of shrimp caught on the three 
most important inland waters of Southern Benin (Lakes Ahémé and Nokoué and the 
Laguna of Porto Novo) were designated for export of mainly frozen shrimp destined for 
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the EU market (BTC, 2007; Le Ry et al., 2007). The remaining 2,000 tonnes, usually of a 
smaller size and lower quality (in function of their freshness, cleanness, size and color) 
were dried, smoked or cooked and consumed locally.  
Figure 2 shows shrimp-export data from Benin and West Africa, the year of the 
ban being indicated with a vertical grey line. The left Panel shows that, upon the 2003 
export ban, shrimp exports from Benin to the EU completely collapsed and remained 
close to zero even after the ban was lifted in 2005. That the collapse of Beninese exports 
is related to the export ban, and not to a supply shock due to some natural phenomena 
affecting the regional shrimp stock is supported by the right Panel of Figure 2, which 
shows that shrimp exports from other West-African countries to the EU remained 
relatively stable throughout the period. 
FIGURE 2 HERE 
2.2 A narrative account of Benin’s export ban 
This narrative account is largely based on semi-structured interviews we conducted in 
2009-2013 with the exporting firms, fishmongers, government staff, donors, and credit 
managers in the banking sector.  
2.2.1 The ban  
In August 2002, Spain sent a notification to the RASFF about the presence of a high 
proportion of bacteria (enterobacteriaceae) and micro-organisms (aerobic mesophiles) 
detected in a sample of frozen shrimp imported from Benin. Following this notification, 
the EU Food and Veterinary Office (FVO) conducted its first inspection of Benin’s 
shrimp sector in October 2002.  
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The inspection report pointed to the following six main deficiencies (EU DG 
SANCO, 2003): (1) shortcomings in Benin’s legislation with respect to hygiene and the 
control of fishery products; (2) lack of human resources at the competent authority; (3) 
lack of EU-accredited laboratories to monitor the safety norms applied to shrimp; (4) the 
non-conform use of chlorine and additives by exporting firms; (5) the non-application of  
HACCP in exporting firms; and (6) bad practices with respect to hygiene and the 
environment at the level of the fishermen and fishmongers. Among others, this last 
deficiency refers to the practice of fishermen keeping the shrimp on the surface of their 
wooden canoes instead of preserving them in isothermal containers with ice.  
Given these deficiencies, the FVO suggested that the Beninese government 
suspend its fishery exports to the EU and correct them. Not doing so would increase the 
risk of an official EU ban on Benin’s fishery exports (SFP, 2003). Hence, following the 
decision of the Beninese Minister charged with fisheries, the self-imposed ban on exports 
was signed on July 11, 2003.9  
Since the shrimp season extends from January to August, the exporting firms had 
large quantities of frozen shrimp in stock when the auto-suspension was signed. The FVO 
requested that 189 tons of shrimp be destroyed (Le Ry et al., 2007). More importantly, 
the entire export sector was officially put on non-active for almost 20 months until the 
ban was lifted. 
2.2.2 Aftermath of the ban 
The ban was lifted in February 2005 following significant improvements in conforming 
to the EU safety norms. In particular, the government updated the legal codes, provided 
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trainings on sanitary issues to small-scale actors, strengthened the Competent Authority, 
and upgraded three laboratories. The exporting firms resolved the nonconformities and 
adopted the HACCP system (UNIDO, 2010).  
One of the biggest challenges was ensuring the traceability and responsibility of 
all the actors along the chain. Since 2004, the EU regulations have required auto-controls 
at all levels of the supply chain rather than leaving the control up to a central laboratory. 
In order to enable fishermen to respect safety norms and collectors to control the quality 
of shrimp purchased, facilities were constructed, which included the transformation of 
rudimentary landing sites into transfer platforms (TP) for receiving, selecting and rinsing 
shrimp before putting them in isothermal containers with ice.10 In addition to the TPs, 
control units (CU) were established to sample loads of shrimp for quality control. These 
improvements were to a large extent financed by the donor community and implemented 
in collaboration with the Beninese government agencies and other local actors. 
Furthermore, donor and government institutions have organized training sessions to raise 
awareness of small-scale actors about the ban and about what is expected from them in 
order to comply with standards 
Thanks to these efforts, Benin made it to List 1 in December 2009, which gives a 
select number of "harmonized" or "approved" countries that are allowed to export fishery 
products to all EU countries without being subject to additional legislation on the part of 
individual EU countries.11 However, as we write (October 2014) the sector has yet to 
recover from the ban.  
An analysis of the failure to restart export can been found in Houssa and 
Verpoorten (2013) where we argue that shrimp exports did not revive because local and 
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international institutions failed to resolve the sector's inadequate financial, human and 
institutional capacity, and therefore its increased perceived riskiness among bankers and 
exporters. Despite the improvements made, there was insufficient domestic capacity 
building to allow the country to keep up with rapidly evolving EU food safety norms. The 
high product-specific sanitary risk in a context of poor “hard” and “soft” infrastructure 
scares investors. For instance, better regional infrastructure could have enabled firms to 
source shrimps from a larger area, allowing them to cover the additional (fixed) costs 
triggered by standards. Alternatively, better-functioning contractual institutions, and 
more co-operation, information exchange and trust among the inter-dependent actors in 
the supply chain, could have helped exporters to aim for quality labels, of which the price 
premium would have covered the increased costs. 
 
3. IMPACT OF THE BAN 
We employ two complementary approaches to analyze the short and medium-run effects 
of the export ban on small-scale actors. First, we discuss these effects within an open-
economy supply-demand model for shrimp. Second, we rely on survey data to examine 
the impact of the ban as well as the coping strategies used by the small-scale actors. The 
model allows us to trace the mechanisms through which the ban affects small-scale 
producers. The survey complements the model, as it allows us to study the reactions of 
the producers.  
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3.1. The ban’s impact in an open-economy supply-demand framework  
We model the market for fresh shrimp in Benin, focusing on the involvement of three 
main actors: (i) fishermen; (ii) local consumers in Benin and in neighboring countries; 
and (iii) the exporting firms.12 
Fishermen supply two qualities of shrimp: high and low. The high quality shrimp 
is characterized by its larger size and pink color. Exporting firms buy only the high 
quality, whereas local consumers may buy both high and low quality shrimp. A premium 
is paid for the high quality. Because exporting firms sell at the world market, they can 
afford paying a higher premium for high quality shrimp than domestic consumers. 
Moreover, export demand for shrimp is perfectly elastic, assuring daily market clearance 
for the fishermen. This market segmentation implies three, different but, interrelated 
segments of the Benin’s shrimp supply chain: i) the domestic market for low quality 
shrimp; ii) the domestic market for high quality shrimp; and iii) the export market for 
high quality shrimp.  
We integrate these features into the standard open-economy, supply-demand 
framework (e.g., Baldwin and Wyplosz, 2009 and Krugman et al., 2011) and demonstrate 
the impact of the export ban on exporting firms and small-scale actors. See the Appendix 
and Figure A for details. 
The model predicts the following impacts of the ban. In the short-run the ban 
generates a loss to fishermen due to the decrease of both the world market demand and 
price paid for high-quality shrimp. Local consumers derive a welfare gain from the ban as 
they are now able to buy high quality shrimp, but – as can be seen in the supply-demand 
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diagram - this gain is less than the loss of the fishermen’s producer surplus. Moreover, as 
good quality shrimp are now supplied to the local markets, the demand for its substitute 
(bad quality shrimp) shifts to the left, leading to a further reduction of the welfare of the 
fishermen (see Panel b of Figure A).  
In the medium run the situation of fishermen does not significantly improve as the 
exports to the EU did not revive, and its loss was only partly compensated by an 
expansion of the regional market (see Panel c of Figure A). While our interviews with 
intermediate traders revealed that the regional market for good-quality shrimp expanded 
since the ban, with increased sales to neighboring countries (Nigeria, Togo, Gabon and 
Ghana), the traders also noted that this increase could not compensate for their loss of the 
EU export market; partly because of the high transaction costs in the forms of border 
taxes and the poor transport infrastructure to the regional markets. They also complained 
about price fluctuations in these markets and the lack of timely payment (for the latter 
point, see also Allegre and Dupret, 2010).  
Overall, the model predicts a persistent negative income shock for small-scale 
actors in the fishery sector. How do the small-scale actors react? Can they curb the 
negative impact? 
 
3.2 Evidence from a survey among fishermen and fishmongers 
While the ban implies a decline of the producer surplus in the fishery sector, in the longer 
run, a number of small-scale actors may compensate this loss with income from other 
activities. To assess whether fishermen and fishmongers face persistent income losses, 
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we study their income and activity portfolio changes on the basis of data from a survey 
that was undertaken in 2009, six years after the imposition of the ban. We start by 
presenting the sample of small-scale actors that were part of our survey. 
3.2.1 Data used 
The households that are part of our survey were selected from the 2006 fishery census, 
which recorded information on 27,568 small-scale actors, mostly fishermen and 
fishmongers, operating in the fishery sector of southern Benin. We took a random sample 
of 540 households, stratified geographically across 18 villages that are part of three 
administrative communes located on the three lakes: Lake Nokoué (So-Ava Commune), 
Lake Ahémé (Kpomasse Commune) and Lagune de Porto-Novo (Aguégués Commune). 
Within these households, we selected 516 fishermen and 394 fishmongers (mainly the 
fishermen’s wives) for individual interviews. The location of the three communes and 
lakes is shown in Figure 3.  
The communes differ in a number of aspects that are likely to play a role in the 
heterogeneous impact of the ban across the lakes. So-Ava, located on the largest lake, is 
the most remote commune. It harbors many traditional fishing villages, built on the water, 
resulting in pollution from human waste and therefore lower quality of shrimp with 
respect to the EU standard. Aguegues, located at the medium-size lake, is the least remote 
commune and provides shrimp of intermediate quality. Kpomasse is located furthest from 
the exporting firms at the smallest lake, but it can easily be reached across land. It was 
the preferred supplier of the exporting firms because of its highly appreciated quality of 
shrimp (reflected in a larger size and more reddish color of the shrimp). Because of this 
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reason, we expect fishermen at Kpomasse to be most affected by the ban. In contrast, we 
expect fishermen at So-Ava to be least affected by the ban, given the commune’s 
remoteness and its inferior quality of shrimp 
FIGURE 3 HERE 
The household members were interviewed in the period March-July 2009, during 
the 2009 shrimp season, by the authors of this paper and a team of 30 enumerators and 4 
supervisors. In order to collect accurate information on income and consumption, the 
households were visited every two weeks. During each of these visits, income and 
consumption data were recorded. In addition, a standard household module was 
implemented covering different topics at each visit, such as social capital, credit, annual 
income and economic activities, shocks and coping strategies, health and education. From 
the data, we found that household income in 2009 stemmed for more than 80% from the 
fishery sector of which 30% was accounted for by the shrimp subsector.  
During the first survey visit, the fishermen and fishmongers were asked to share their 
experiences regarding the ban. The following open questions were asked13:  
(i) Are you aware that there has been a ban? (If no: go to the next section)  
(ii) In your opinion, what was the cause of the ban?  
(iii) What impact did the ban have on your income immediately after the ban (in 
2003) and today (in 2009)?  
(iv) What explains this impact? 
(v) If the impact was negative, how did the household react to cope with it, 
immediately after the ban (in 2003) and today (in 2009)? 
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3.2.2 Awareness about the ban and its cause  
We study the impact of the ban only for the subsample of small-scale actors that knew 
about the ban at the time of the survey. Table 1 shows that 744 out of 910 (82%) 
fishermen and fishmongers knew about the ban. This proportion varied across the 
communes. In So-Ava, the commune that is most isolated and was supplying the lowest 
quality of shrimp, only 68% of the fishermen and fishmongers were aware of the ban. In 
Kpomasse and Aguegues, 81% and 97% of the fishermen and fishmongers knew about 
the ban. The variation across communes suggests that awareness is nonrandom, and our 
subsample of respondents to questions (ii)-(v) is thus specific. More precisely, awareness 
is likely to be higher for fishermen who supplied shrimp to the exporting firms. Since 
these fishermen are also likely to be more affected by the export ban, the results of our 
subsample analysis on the impact of the ban should be interpreted as an upper bound of 
the ban’s impact on the fishermen communities. 
While most of the small-scale actors knew about the ban, the awareness about the 
actual cause of the ban was relatively low, despite trainings received.14 Regarding 
question (ii), about the cause of the ban (asked to those who knew about the ban), only 
40% of the fishermen and 45% of fishmongers report as a cause that “the food safety 
norms were not sufficiently respected”; while 20% said they had no idea why. In the 
remaining 30% to 40%, the answers varied widely, including “the Europeans no longer 
had money”, “the firms went bankrupt”, “the local authorities were arguing”, “the 
European who bought the shrimp is on a holiday”, “we need to provide food to Beninese 
markets (instead of European markets)”, “it is because of the use of prohibited fishing 
gears” and “the Houedah are behind it”.15 The knowledge about the cause of the ban was 
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highest in Kpomasse, at 61%, compared to 38% in Aguegues, and 26% in So-Ava. 
Again, this variation suggests that those better informed about the ban are those who 
were more involved in the shrimp export supply chain.  
TABLE 1 HERE 
3.2.3 The self-reported income effect of the ban 
Table 2, Panel A summarizes the responses to question (iii) on the self-reported income 
effect of the ban in 2003. Close to 59% of the respondents reported a very negative 
impact in the short run, and 26% report a rather negative impact. Approximately 9% 
reported no impact, and about 5% mentioned a positive impact. Corresponding well with 
its status as preferred supplier to the exporting firms, Kpomasse had the highest 
proportion of actors mentioning a strongly negative impact (84%), followed by Aguegues 
(56%) and So-Ava (33%).  
When asked about the reason for the negative short-run impact of the ban (question 
iv), more than 70% of those who reported a negative impact attributed it to “a low price 
because of lack of purchasers”. This is consistent with the price decrease that features in 
the model presented in Section 3.2.1. Other reported reasons are diverse and include “the 
market is far”, “it is complicated now that we have to sell to Togolese, Gabonese and 
Nigerian markets”, or “we have to throw away the shrimp or smoke them for lack of 
buyers of fresh shrimp”.  
Among the 5% who reported a positive impact, the reason mentioned is “new market 
opportunities”. From our interviews, we learned this was the case for relatively large 
intermediate traders who increased their interactions with markets in neighboring 
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countries. This suggests that the ban on exports to Europe thus opened the way for 
increased regional trade, be it to the benefit of a selected number of intermediate traders. 
TABLE 2 HERE 
What about the ban’s impact in the medium run? Panel B of Table 2 summarizes the 
self-reported assessment of the ban’s impact in 2009, 6 years after the imposition of the 
ban. Up to 52% of the local actors still reported a very negative impact, and 30% reported 
a rather negative impact. The most frequently cited reasons for the persistent negative 
effect were the persistently low price and the difficulty of selling in distant markets.  
We expect the ban’s income effect to be more negative for small-scale actors that 
were involved in the shrimp export supply chain at the time of the ban. To verify this, we 
turn to a multivariate regression analysis. Our dependent variable is an indicator variable 
taking one if the self-reported impact of the ban was very negative (and zero otherwise). 
We construct this variable both for the immediate effect in 2003, and for the medium-run 
effect in 2009. As our explanatory variable of interest, we include an indicator variable 
on the actor’s involvement in the shrimp sector in 2003; and we control for years of 
schooling and lake fixed effects. The results in Table 3 show that, in the short run, the 
impact of the ban was more negative for shrimp fishers. Interestingly, in the medium run, 
there is no significant difference of the ban’s impact on shrimp and fish fishers.16 A study 
of coping strategies can shed light on this result.  
TABLE 3 HERE 
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3.2.4 Coping strategies 
To understand how the small-scale producers in our sample reacted to this shock, we 
study their answers to question (v): “If the impact was negative, how did the household 
react to cope with it immediately after the ban (in 2003) and today (in 2009)?”  
The answers are summarized in Table 4. Given that the shock was covariant and 
persistent, it is not surprising that the households in our sample rarely reported mutual 
insurance (“asking for help from friends and family”) as a coping strategy, while 
“developing another activity“ was more frequently reported. Other coping strategies were 
“no reaction”, “consume less”, “selling assets”, “take consumption credit”, “work more 
hours”, and – to a lesser extent - “take child(ren) out of school”. Much less frequently 
reported coping strategies are pooled in the category “other”, and include among others 
“reduce the number of children” and “migrate to Nigeria”.  
TABLE 4 HERE 
A number of these coping strategies reduce the household’s capital, be it physical or 
human. While contributing to consumption smoothing in the short run, such strategies 
may negatively affect income in the longer run. The most viable coping strategy when 
faced with a prolonged negative demand shock for shrimp would be to switch to another 
activity. This conjecture finds support in the data. Among the 63 fishermen who reported 
having switched activities following the ban, 39% reported a very negative impact of the 
ban in 2009 compared to 60% of all fishermen, and 73% of fishermen reporting the 
coping strategies “no reaction”, “asset sale”, and “consume less”. For fishwives, we find 
similar results. The 51 fishwives who changed activities reported a very negative impact 
in 33% of cases compared to an average of 53%. 
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To investigate the effectiveness of an activity-portfolio change further, we analyze 
data from a module on economic activities asking fishermen about their economic 
activities in 2002 and in 2009. Among the 63 fishermen who self-reported having 
switched activities following the ban, the large majority (77%) remained in the fishery 
sector, switching to fishing fish (instead of shrimp). Thus, they ended up competing with 
other fishermen for the scarce fishery stock, which may explain why – in the medium-run 
– fish fishers suffered no less from the ban than shrimp fishers (as was shown in Column 
3 of Table 3). Only 14 fishermen who changed activities between 2002 and 2009 (23%) 
switched to activities outside the fishery sector, mainly petty trade, livestock raising and 
agriculture. These fishermen reported a very negative income effect of the ban only in 
29% of cases compared to 42% for those who switched activities within the fishery 
sector, which suggests that switching to the non-fishery sector was the most effective 
coping strategy. 
We verify this result in a regression analysis in which we regress an indicator variable 
taking one if the self-reported medium-run impact of the ban was very negative on 
indicator variables of income diversification, inside and outside the fishery sector (taken 
from the survey module on economic activities). We control for years of schooling and 
being a shrimp fisher or trader at the time of the ban, as well as lake fixed effects. The 
results, given in columns 1-2 of Table 5, confirm that diversification outside the fishery 
sector strongly decreases the probability of a very negative income effect of the ban in 
2009.  
One could object that the choice to move out of the fishing sector is endogenous, in 
which case our result may not reflect the successfulness of this diversification strategy, 
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but rather an unobserved characteristic of the small-scale actor that correlates both with 
diversification and the impact of the ban. For instance, a fisherman that has an extensive 
social network, may suffer less from a negative income shock (e.g. though informal 
insurance) and be able to use his network to enter into other economic activities. 
However, if such spurious correlation would be driving our result, we would expect 
diversification to be also related to the immediate impact of the ban (in 2003). In a 
falsification test, reported in columns 5 and 6 of Table 5, we find that this is not the case.  
TABLE 5 HERE 
In sum, the persistence of the self-reported negative welfare impact suggests that the 
domestic and regional demand did not succeed in substituting for EU demand even after 
considerable time. It also indicates that most small-scale actors were unable to fully cope 
with the drop in shrimp demand by substituting shrimp fishing and trading with another 
activity, which would be the coping strategy par excellence for dealing with a persistent 
covariant shock. Among those who diversified, most diversified within the fishery sector, 
ending up competing with fish fishers and fish traders who were not engaged in the 
shrimp sector at the time of the ban. This competition may explain why, in the medium-
run, the negative effect of the ban was equally strong for fish fishers.   
That the relatively successful coping strategy of diversification to the non-fishery 
sectors was used by only a handful of local actors suggests that access to these other 
sectors is constrained. In a related study on the determinants of income diversification in 
the fishing communities of southern Benin, we explain the low degree of income 
diversification among fishermen in terms of the remoteness of their communities, the 
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difficulty of access to agricultural land, and the lack of schooling with close to 70% of 
active adults being illiterate (Stoop et al., 2013). 
3.2.5 Migration 
Our qualitative fieldwork revealed that, while the emigration of entire households is 
uncommon, the emigration of household members – especially to similar fishing grounds 
in Nigeria - is rather common. The fact that migration was only mentioned as a coping 
strategy by two of our respondents is likely to stem from selection bias; those who 
migrated had lower chances ending up in our sample. This selection bias may not only 
bias the coping strategies that we recorded, but also the reported income effect of the ban, 
with the direction of the bias depending on whether migrants were more or less 
successful than non-migrants in coping with the ban.  
To gauge the extent of migration and its potential bias, we turn to the 2009 survey 
module that included the household roster. Of the 1871 household members aged 15 to 
65, 131 or 7% were reported to be temporarily absent. Among the absent members, 72 
left for work purposes. Among those, 41 were reported to be working in the fishery sector 
in Nigeria. 
We did not have the means to track these migrants and find out whether they 
successfully coped with the ban’s income shock. But, in case they did, some of their 
success may have spilled over to other members of their household that remained in 
Benin. Hence, we tentatively explore the effect of migration by comparing fishermen in 
our sample with and without household members fishing in Nigeria. Adding the number 
of temporary work-related migrants to our regression model, the estimated coefficient on 
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this variable is found to be negative and significant (at the 10% level), suggesting that 
temporary migration reduced the ban’s negative income effect in the medium-run.  
Again, one could object that this result is driven by endogeneity, i.e. some 
unobserved factor driving the correlation between migration and the ban’s moderate 
impact. We therefore turn again to a falsification test. The last two columns of Table 5 
show that the number of temporary migrants is unrelated to the immediate effect of the 
ban in 2003, reducing the concern that we pick up a spurious correlation between the 
effect of the ban and migration. 
In sum, this finding suggests that migration may be a relatively successful coping 
strategy, and that, since migrants are largely excluded from our subsample, we may have 
overestimated the negative impact of the ban. Nevertheless, even in the subsample of 
households with temporary migrants, 42% reported a very negative medium-run income 
effect of the ban, suggesting that migration would not entirely cancel out our result of a 
negative income effect of the ban. 
5. DISCUSSION  
Benin’s shrimp sector collapsed upon the 2003 export ban, and the sector did not revive, 
despite the lift of the ban in 2005. Some of the factors that underlie the failure of exports 
to revive, notably the poor “hard” and “soft” infrastructure, also constrain the way small-
scale producers can cope with the negative income shock, and therefore its welfare 
implications. 
What are the welfare implications of the ban at the level of small-scale producers? 
This paper points out that the ban had a large and persistent negative impact on the 
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income of fishermen and fishmongers. The access to markets of rich countries translated 
into a perfectly elastic demand of exporting firms, assuring daily market clearance as well 
as a price premium for the fishermen. Being small, much poorer, and plagued by high 
transport and transaction costs and with limited access to inexpensive preservation 
technology, the domestic and regional markets could not take over this role. In addition, 
fishermen were constrained in their access to the non-fishery sector. As such, switching 
activities proved an accessible coping strategy for only a handful of fishers and was 
insufficient to compensate for the loss in producer surplus. Instead, shrimp fishers 
engaged in competition with fish fishers or intensified their shrimp fishing activity, 
thereby compromising the future fishery stock.  
One lesson we can draw from these findings is that, in the face of a ban or another 
export market shock, policymakers and donor agencies should put in place safety net 
programs to mitigate the shock’s negative impact on households (Skoufias, 2003; Grosh 
et al. 2008). Such safety nets may safeguard households from seeking recourse to coping 
strategies that have long-term negative effects, such as depleting assets or withdrawing 
children from school. At the same time, there should be support for those household 
coping strategies that are viable in the longer run and do not inflict negative externalities 
on other households in the same community (such as overfishing). In the case of the 
fishing communities, this means supporting common pool resource management and 
income diversification outside the fishery sector, e.g. through micro-credit schemes and 
training programs. A more general lesson one can draw from the case of Benin’s shrimp 
sector is that, besides safety nets upon shocks, what needs to be built is domestic capacity 
that will enable export sectors and small-scale producers to confidently manage risk and 
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deal with shocks. This will involve addressing root causes rather than symptoms, through 
firm political commitment rather than fragmented donor efforts.  
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Figure 1:  
Shrimp exports from Benin and West-Africa to the EU  
Note: the West African data are obtained as a simple average of the following five 
countries: Cote d’Ivoire, Ghana, Nigeria, Senegal, and Togo. The grey area shows the 
year of the EU ban. 
Sources: Data is taken from BACI database, which present the UN Comtrade database in 
a consistent way; see http://www.cepii.fr/CEPII/en/bdd_modele/presentation.asp?id=1, 
November 10, 2013 
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Figure 2:  
Benin’s inland shrimp supply chain 
Source: Our own compilation of information from several reports (e.g., SFP, 2003 and 
EU-DG SANCO, 2003)  
 
 
Artisanal fishers (45,000) 
Local transformers 
who smoke shrimp 
for local and 
regional market 
Three exporting firms that 
peel, freeze and export 
shrimp (CRUSTAMER, SOBEP 
and FSG); one firm that 
exports a small quantity of 
fresh shrimp (DIAX) 
EU regulation 
Competent authority 
(CA) that controls 
compliance with 
standards 
Banks and other 
Financial Institutions 
National committee of 
debt 
Intermediate traders (18,000): 
Mainly fishermen’s wives & collectors 
recognized by exporting firms 
36 
 
 
Figure 4:  
Map of survey area 
Note: Kpomasse lays at Lake Ahémé, So-Ava at Lake Nokoué and Aguegues at the 
intersection of Lake Nokoué and Lagune de Porto-Novo  
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Table 1: Awareness about the ban and its cause 
 
  Total Fishermen Fishmongers Kpomasse So-Ava Aguesgues 
"Are you aware that there has been a ban?"  
Yes (%) 82 82 82 81 68 97 
Obs 910 516 394 299 306 291 
"What is the cause of the ban?" (correct answer: "The food safety norms were not respected") 
Correct answer (%) 42 40 45 61 26 38 
Obs 744 422 322 241 209 291 
 
Source: household survey conducted in 2009 by the authors of this paper. 
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Table 2: Self-reported assessment of the impact of the export suspension 
 
Panel A: short-term (impact in in 2003) (%) 
  Total Fishermen Fishmongers Kpomasse So-Ava Aguesgues 
Strongly negative 59 57 60 84 33 55 
Rather negative 26 26 26 10 56 18 
No impact 9 11 6 2 8 15 
Rather positive 4 4 5 1 0 10 
Strongly positive 1 0 2 2 0 1 
I don't know 1 1 1 1 3 0 
Panel B: medium-term (impact in 2009) (%) 
  Total Fishermen Fishmongers Kpomasse So-Ava Aguesgues 
Strongly negative 52 51 53 66 36 51 
Rather negative 30 29 31 22 40 29 
No impact 11 13 9 8 9 16 
Rather positive 4 5 4 2 10 2 
Strongly positive 1 1 1 1 1 0 
I don't know 2 2 2 0 4 1 
Obs 744 422 322 241 209 291 
 
Source: household survey conducted in 2009 by the authors of this paper. 
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Table 3: Determinants of the ban's income effect, short-run and medium-run 
 
Dependent variable: very 
negative impact 
Short run (2003) Medium run (2009) 
Fishermen Fishmongers Fishermen Fishmongers 
            
Years of schooling -0.027 0.014 0.004 -0.070** 
    
(0.023) (0.040) (0.023) (0.035) 
Involved in shrimp sector in 
2003 
0.554*** 0.285 0.226 0.299 
(0.211) (0.283) (0.204) (0.275) 
Lake fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Obs 422 322 422 322 
 
Probit model estimation. Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table 4: Self-reported coping strategies upon the ban  
 
  Fishermen Fishmongers 
  2003 2009 2003 2009 
  Nr. % Nr. % Nr. % Nr. % 
No reaction 70 20 73 21 53 19 61 22 
Asset sale 44 13 18 5 20 7 11 4 
Consume less 61 18 56 16 61 22 43 15 
Take consumption credit 31 9 24 7 24 9 30 11 
Engage in other ec. act. 62 18 63 18 51 18 57 21 
Work more hours 31 9 66 19 25 9 41 15 
Take child out of school 23 7 10 3 6 2 8 3 
Help from family or friends 12 3 14 4 23 8 14 5 
Help from government or NGO 1 0 8 2 7 3 7 3 
Other 13 4 16 5 8 3 6 2 
Total 348 100 348 100 278 100 278 100 
 
Source: household survey conducted in 2009 by the authors of this paper. 
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Table 5: Income diversification, migration and the ban's income effect 
 
Dependent variable: very 
negative impact 
Medium run (2009) Short run (2003) 
Fishermen Fishmongers Fishermen Fishmongers Fishermen Fishmongers 
                
Years of schooling 0.009 -0.063* 0.009 -0.063* -0.029 0.015 
    (0.023) (0.035) (0.023) (0.035) (0.023) (0.041) 
Involved in shrimp sector in 
2003 
0.249 0.232 0.186 0.229 0.503** 0.263 
(0.206) (0.273) (0.211) (0.274) (0.216) (0.283) 
Coping strategies 2009:             
  
Diversify into fish fishing 
or trading 
0.001 -0.363 0.068 -0.357 0.286 -0.340 
(0.216) (0.256) (0.222) (0.256) (0.226) (0.265) 
  
Diversify out of fishery 
sector 
-
0.940*** -1.146*** 
-
0.942*** -1.135*** 0.260 -0.249 
(0.331) (0.311) (0.332) (0.311) (0.364) (0.301) 
  
Household members 
migrated for work 
    -0.252* 0.013 -0.034 -0.021 
    
(0.133) (0.142) (0.101) (0.142) 
Lake fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Obs 422 322 422 322 422 322 
 
Probit model estimation. Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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APPENDIX: THE BAN’S IMPACT IN A SUPPLY-DEMAND FRAMEWORK  
Section (a) models the main features of Benin’s market for fresh shrimp before the ban, 
i.e., when the exporting firms were operating. Sections (b) and (c) illustrate the short-term 
and medium-term impacts of the ban, respectively. Our time frame for the short-run is the 
period under which the ban was in force, i.e., from July 2003 till February 2005; while 
the medium-run time frame stretches from February 2005 - when the ban was lifted – to  
2009, when we conducted our fieldwork.  
 
a) The Model and the situation prior to the ban 
We make the following four assumptions. First, fishermen supply shrimp every day; 𝑞𝑏𝑑 
low-quality shrimp to local consumers and 𝑞𝑔𝑑 and 𝑞𝑔𝑋 high-quality shrimp to local 
consumers and exporting firms, respectively. The prices related to these quantities (𝑞𝑏𝑑, 
𝑞𝑔
𝑑 and 𝑞𝑔𝑋) are denoted by 𝑝𝑏𝑑, 𝑝𝑔𝑑 and 𝑝𝑔𝑋 where 𝑝𝑏𝑑 < 𝑝𝑔𝑑 ≤ 𝑝𝑔𝑋. Second, as both the 
good and bad quality shrimp are caught with the same fishing gear, the supply curves of 
the two qualities of shrimp, denoted by 𝑆𝑔 and 𝑆𝑏 , are assumed to be identical. Each 
supply curve is a positive function of the shrimp price. Third, the supply is bounded by 
the available stock of shrimp in the lakes (which is exogenous in our model, although in 
reality depends on weather and environmental conditions as well as on past fishing 
intensity). We denote the stock of each quality of shrimp by 𝑞𝑏∗ and 𝑞𝑔∗, respectively.  
The fourth assumption we make is that local consumers and fishermen are price 
takers, i.e., they cannot determine the local market price for shrimp. The exporting firms 
are price takers on the world market as they cannot determine their export price 𝑝𝑤. In the 
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local market, however, the handful of exporting firms set the price 𝑝𝑔𝑋 at which they 
acquire shrimp from fishermen and buy at this price as long as they earn a markup 𝜀 
equal to 𝑝𝑤 − 𝑝𝑔𝑋 − 𝑐, where 𝑐 represents the expected marginal cost (including the costs 
of transporting, treating, freezing and packaging the shrimp as well as the cost of external 
financing from banks).xvii Thus, the demand curve of the exporting firms, 𝐷𝑔𝑋, is assumed 
to be perfectly elastic.  
Figure A (a)-(c), summarizes our open-economy, supply-demand model for the 
market of fresh shrimp in Benin. Panel (a) presents the situation before the ban, i.e., at the 
moment when the exporting firms were operating. Panels (b) and (c) show the short-run 
and medium-run impacts of the ban, respectively. Each panel has three diagrams: the left 
and middle diagrams represent the domestic market for low and high quality shrimp, 
respectively, while the diagram on the right gives the export market for high quality 
shrimp.  
FIGURE A HERE 
In the right-hand diagram of Panel (a), exporting firms break even at the quantity 
𝑞𝑔
𝑋 for which they pay a unit price 𝑝𝑔𝑋 to the fishermen. For the same quality of shrimp, 
local consumers are willing to pay only 𝑝𝑔𝑑 ,  𝑝𝑔𝑑 < 𝑝𝑔𝑋, (middle diagram of Panel (a)). As a 
result, fishermen sell all of their good quality shrimp to the exporting firms.xviii Under 
these assumptions and given the world price of shrimp 𝑝𝑤 and operating costs 𝑐, 
exporting firms derive a profit represented by the purple area HIJK in the right diagram.  
The producer surplus of fishermen has two parts: one related to their supply of the 
low quality to domestic consumers, which is represented by the green area 𝐴𝐴𝑝𝑏𝑑 in the 
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left diagram; and the other is derived from the supply of high quality shrimp to the 
exporting firms given by the domain 𝐶𝐶𝐶 in the middle diagram. The latter can be further 
split into two parts: the green area 𝐷𝐶𝐷 represents what the fishermen would obtain if 
they sold all high-quality shrimp to local consumers, and the dark red area 𝐶𝐷𝐷𝐶 
represents the additional welfare fishermen obtain by selling a larger quantity at a higher 
price to exporting firms. The export regime is clearly beneficial for shrimp fishers. 
The export regime represented in Panel (a) is not beneficial for local consumers as 
it deprives them of high quality shrimp. Their loss is represented by the area CDG in the 
middle diagram. Note, however, that the welfare gain of the fishermen under the export 
regime is much greater than the welfare loss of the local consumers. The area CFG 
represents this positive net welfare gain. Besides, the exporting firms also create 
employment and contribute to the foreign reserves of the central bank, adding to the 
overall positive welfare impacts of the export regime.  
b) Short-run impacts of the export ban 
Panel (b) illustrates the short-term impacts of the export ban. As shown in the right 
diagram, it causes the demand 𝐷𝑔𝑋 from the exporting firms to shift down to zero. As a 
result, the profit of exporting firms disappears completely. In addition, but not shown in 
the figure, the firms have to suffer the loss due to the destruction of their stock and also 
have to lay off employees.  
The ban also generates a loss to fishermen corresponding to the area 𝐶𝐷𝐷𝐶 in the 
middle diagram. However, local consumers derive a welfare gain from the ban as they are 
now able to buy high quality shrimp. This gain, given by the area 𝐶𝐷𝐷, is less than the 
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loss of the fishermen’s producer surplus. This is not, however, the end of the story. As 
good quality shrimp are now supplied to the local markets, the demand for its substitute 
(bad quality shrimp) 𝐷𝑏𝑑 shifts to the left, leading to a further reduction of the welfare of 
the fishermen. 
In sum: the ban is bad news, both for the exporting firms and the fishermen.  
c) Medium-run impacts of the ban 
In 2005 the export ban was lifted, but the firms did not resume activities. The reasons for 
this failure were discussed in detail in Houssa and Verpoorten (2013). Among the various 
reasons were the higher compliance costs faced by the firms. Their impact is illustrated in 
Panel (c). The diagram on the right shows that, in the medium-run (MR) after the ban, the 
exporting firms faced costs cMR, which were significantly higher than the pre-ban cost 𝑐. 
Keeping the export price 𝑝𝑤 and the markup 𝜀 fixed, these additional costs imply 
that the firms will only operate when they can purchase shrimp at a lower price pgXMR. 
However, if pgXMR    is less than the local market price pgdMR , then all the good-quality 
shrimp will be sold locally. This scenario, depicted in the middle and right diagrams of 
Panel (c), corresponds to the information received during our field trip. 
Our interviews with intermediate traders revealed that the local market for good-
quality shrimp expanded since the ban, with increased sales to neighboring countries 
(Nigeria, Togo, Gabon and Ghana). This expansion led to a price increase in the local 
markets, such that pgdMR > pgXMR (see the middle diagram). However, the traders also 
noted that this increase could not compensate for their loss of the European export 
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market; partly because of the high transaction costs in the forms of border taxes and the 
poor transport infrastructure to the local markets. They also complained about price 
fluctuations in the local markets and the lack of timely payment (for the latter point, see 
also Allegre and Dupret, 2010).  
 In sum: increased costs and evolving competition in the local (and international) 
market in the aftermath of the ban, led to a reduction of the profitability of exporting 
firms, and therefore to a failure to restart export activities. 
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Figure A:  
Open-economy, demand-supply framework for the market for fresh shrimp in Benin 
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ENDNOTES 
                                                          
1 HACCP is a systematic preventive approach to food safety that addresses physical, chemical, and 
biological hazards. The system is used at all stages of the food-production and preparation processes; 
including packaging and distribution, in order to assure traceability of hazards throughout the entire 
supply chain. 
2 Other observers have noted that the new landscape of stringent and rapidly evolving standards may 
instead provide opportunities for developing countries to upgrade their export sectors by means of 
increased foreign direct investment and vertical integration (e.g., Jaffee and Henson, 2005; Henson and 
Jaffee, 2006). For example, in order to comply with standards, domestic or multinational firms involved in 
food exports from a developing country may invest more resources, interact more with the local small-
scale producers, and provide them with inputs and technology (Gow and Swinnen, 1998; Maertens and 
Swinnen, 2009). Besides, stringent standards may act as a catalyst to stimulate cooperation and inclusive 
institutions in exporting countries (Colslovsky, 2013).  
3 For instance, Yunus (2009) estimates the short-run cost of the 1997 EU ban on Bangladesh shrimp export 
at $25 million but estimates the gain at $18 million in the first year and additional yearly gains of $35 
million starting from the second year. Keizire (2004) and Henson and Mitullah (2004) reach similar 
qualitative conclusions for the impact of an EU ban on the fishery export sector of Uganda and Kenya, 
respectively. 
4 The ban was actually self-imposed by the Beninese government under pressure by the EU. See Section 2 
for details. 
5 RASFF enables member countries to share information about the risks related to food and feed items in 
real time. The legal basis for the RASFF was put into place in 2002, but the system has been in operation 
since 1979. Current members of RASFF include all of the EU Member States along with Iceland and 
Liechtenstein. The number of notifications in RASFF has increased over time. Over the period 2003-2011, 
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for instance, the number of alert notifications increased from 452 to 617 while information notifications 
and border rejections increased from 302 to 1,253 and from 1,550 to 1,816 respectively (European 
Commission, 2010 and 2011). 
6 This species represents more than 97% of the total shrimp production of the country and is also caught 
in other West African countries such as Cote d’Ivoire, Senegal, Cameroon and Nigeria. 
7 The shrimp lay their eggs in the sea. The larvae grow in the sea till about 7 to 8 mm and then migrate to 
the brackish water in the lagoon during the dry season when the inland water level is low (from January 
till March). The shrimp mature in the inland water and migrate back to the sea when the salinity of the 
inland water has decreased and the water level has increased after the rainy season (around July-August). 
By that time, the shrimp have grown to a length of about 10 cm (Cummings, 1961; Hoestlandt, 1966). 
8 Lake Nohoué is the biggest contributor to the supply of shrimp. According to data reported by Allegre 
and Dupret (2010), its share is estimated at about 2/3 of the total shrimp supply, the combined share of 
Lake Ahémé and the Lagoon of Porto Novo is 1/6. The remaining 1/6 stems from other small lakes around 
the Djegbadji region.  
9 Since this was a self-imposed ban and not a suspension officially imposed by the EU, Benin remained 
officially on the list of countries that could export fishery products to EU. 
10 The location of TPs around the lake should allow fishermen to reach a TP within less than an hour and a 
half. At the site of the CUs, ice ought to be produced in order to refill the containers used by collectors 
and fishermen. The infrastructure works at Lake Ahémé, financed by Belgian Technical Co-operation, were 
completed in 2010 (Beyens, 2010). Four TPs are still under construction in the lagoon of Porto Novo with 
financial support of the government and several donors. 
11 See the Commission Decision 2009/951/UE of December 14, 2009. Each of the three exporting firms 
(CRUSTAMER, FSG and DIAX) also obtained DG SANCO’s approval to export fishery products to the EU on 
December 18, 2009 (SFP, 2010). Prior to Decision 2009/951/UE, Benin was operating under Decision 
 
52 
 
                                                                                                                                                                             
2076/2005/CE, such that the country could export fishery products under bilateral agreements with four 
EU countries: Belgium, France, The Netherlands and Spain. 
12 We do not present the welfare analysis for fishmongers, but the effects go in the same directions as 
those of the fishermen 
13 The question were “open” in the sense that we did not present answer categories to the respondents. 
We did however ask the enumerators to code the answers, making use of a set of codes and potential 
answers that were listed on the questionnaire. These codes included a code for “other”. The answers in 
this miscellaneous category were coded after data-entry.   
14 The survey reveals that 20% of fishermen and 24% of fishmongers in our sample had received a training 
on good practices in the shrimp sector. This is a non-negligible proportion, certainly given the fact that 
after the training, these individuals may share whatever they have learnt with their fellow villagers. 
15 The Houedah is a group which is competing for the fishery resources with the Goun and the Tofin, 
which are different but related groups speaking different dialects belonging to the same family of Gbe 
languages (Hounkpati, 1991). 
16 Fishmongers involved in the shrimp sector at the time of the ban also faced a larger negative income 
effect, but not significantly so. This may indicate that fishmongers find it relatively easy to switch across 
species, e.g. by replacing shrimp trading by fish trading. In contrast, fishermen may find this more difficult 
as the fishing gear they possess may not be readily used across all species. For instance, while the 
medokpokonou is used for shrimp fishing, it is less suited for fish fishing. 
xvii From our interviews with the exporting firms’ managers, we learned that the largest of the four firms is 
the market leader and sets the price when the shrimp season starts. The other firms follow. Data reported 
by PASP (2007) and information derived from our fieldwork indicate that, prior to the ban 𝑝𝑔𝑋 was set at 
about 2 euro per kg, while the exporting firms received a price 𝑝𝑤 of about 6.5 euro per kg. Thus, 𝑝𝑤 −
𝑝𝑔
𝑋, was 4.5 euro per kg and we can hypothesize that 𝑐 + 𝜀 ≤ 4.5 euro. 
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xviii It is possible that some fishermen sell the high quality shrimp to local consumers, but this amount 
would be very small compared to the quantity supplied to exporting firms. Therefore, the model 
normalizes the amount of the high quality of shrimp sold to local consumers to zero.  
